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Two-Stage Cournot Oligopolies with Industry-wide Externalities

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dc.contributor.authorOkuguchi, Koji-
dc.contributor.authorYamazaki, Takeshi-
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-21-
dc.date.available2009-01-21-
dc.date.issued1996-01-
dc.identifier.citationSeoul Journal of Economics, Vol.9 No.1, pp. 1-16-
dc.identifier.issn1225-0279-
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10371/1073-
dc.description.abstractA two-stage Cournot oligopoly with cost functions involving externalities is formulated. A unique subgame perfect Cournot-Nash Equilibrium is proven to exist under a set of reasonable assumptions. The existence proof consists of solving two fixed-point problems for the industry output. The perfect equilibrium is then compared with one-shot Cournot oligopoly equilibrium. The effects of entry are also analyzed. Our result will be illustrated using linear cost and demand functions.-
dc.language.isoen-
dc.publisherInstitute of Economic Research, Seoul National University-
dc.subjectcournot oligopoly-
dc.subjectCournot-Nash-
dc.subjectdemand function-
dc.titleTwo-Stage Cournot Oligopolies with Industry-wide Externalities-
dc.typeSNU Journal-
dc.citation.journaltitleSeoul Journal of Economics-
dc.citation.endpage16-
dc.citation.number1-
dc.citation.pages1-16-
dc.citation.startpage1-
dc.citation.volume9-
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