SHERP

Choosing Roles in a Model of Quality Differentiation

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Authors
Lee, SangHo
Issue Date
1996
Publisher
Seoul Journal of Economics
Citation
Seoul Journal of Economics 9 (No. 3 1996): 191-202
Keywords
leadership solution; sequential duopoly model; unique subgame
Abstract
This paper examines games involving quality differentiation in a sequential duopoly model and points to the leadership solutions. It also deals with the issue of choosing roles (leader or follower) of the firms in quality and price choice game. In this paper, we show that (i) the leadership solutions are the subgame perfect equilibria and simultaneous price competition is in either case of Stackelberg leadership solutions not, and that (ii) the sustaining leadership solution is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium if the diversity of tastes is sufficiently large.
ISSN
1225-0279
Language
English
URI
http://hdl.handle.net/10371/1084
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College of Social Sciences (사회과학대학)Institute of Economics Research (경제연구소)Seoul Journal of EconomicsSeoul Journal of Economics vol.09(3) (Fall 1996)
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