SHERP

Does Uncertain Future Hamper Cooperation?

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Authors
Park, Jinwoo
Issue Date
1996
Publisher
Seoul Journal of Economics
Citation
Seoul Journal of Economics 9 (No. 3 1996): 223-228
Keywords
future stage game; ex-ante future punishment
Abstract
In this paper, a counter example is constructed to show that the equilibrium strategy of Fudenberg and Maskin (1986) can not be applied when players have incomplete information about the future stage game. When the future stage game is uncertain, players have ex-post incentive to deviate from the equilibrium strategy of Fudenberg and Maskin since the ex-ante future punishment is not sufficiently severe.
ISSN
1225-0279
Language
English
URI
http://hdl.handle.net/10371/1087
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College of Social Sciences (사회과학대학)Institute of Economics Research (경제연구소)Seoul Journal of EconomicsSeoul Journal of Economics vol.09(3) (Fall 1996)
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