SHERP

WTO Settlement of Trade Disputes

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Authors
Chung, JaeWan
Issue Date
1997
Publisher
Seoul Journal of Economics
Citation
Seoul Journal of Economics 10 (No. 2 1997): 95-106
Keywords
World Trade organization; WTO process; Neumann-Morgenstern
Abstract
The settlement of trade disputes between two countries by the World Trade Organization (WTO) is determined by the optimal market shares for both plaintiff and defendant countries. The WTO process for a settlement is quasi-judicial. Given that the process for dispute settlement Is similar to that for the outcome of a chance experiment. I use an analytical framework based on von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) utility functions to determine the optimal market shares for both countries In each other's markets. This, In turn, ensures a Pareto optimum. I find that the effects of a retaliatory tariff on the market shares of both countries are dependent upon trade negotiators' attitude toward risk.
ISSN
1225-0279
Language
English
URI
http://hdl.handle.net/10371/1098
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College of Social Sciences (사회과학대학)Institute of Economics Research (경제연구소)Seoul Journal of EconomicsSeoul Journal of Economics vol.10(2) (Summer 1997)
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