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Coase Theorem in Two-sided Matching Marriage Games
DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Chong, Terence Tai-leung | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2009-01-22T04:26:45Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2009-01-22T04:26:45Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 1998-07 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | Seoul Journal of Economics, Vol.11 No.3, pp. 283-294 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 1225-0279 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/10371/1136 | - |
dc.description.abstract | This paper demonstrates the Coase Theorem via a two-sided matching framework. We show that in a residual claimer sharing rule economy. regardless of which party gets the right to claim the residual. the equilibrium marital status maximizes the total output and is identical to the optimal marital status in a central planner dictatorial economy. | - |
dc.language.iso | en | - |
dc.publisher | Institute of Economic Research, Seoul National University | - |
dc.subject | optimal marital status | - |
dc.subject | lifetime partner | - |
dc.subject | marriage market | - |
dc.title | Coase Theorem in Two-sided Matching Marriage Games | - |
dc.type | SNU Journal | - |
dc.citation.journaltitle | Seoul Journal of Economics | - |
dc.citation.endpage | 294 | - |
dc.citation.number | 3 | - |
dc.citation.pages | 283-294 | - |
dc.citation.startpage | 283 | - |
dc.citation.volume | 11 | - |
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