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An Oligopoly Model of Commercial Fishing

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dc.contributor.authorSzidarovszky, Ferenc-
dc.contributor.authorOkuguchi, Koji-
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-22T04:34:12Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-22T04:34:12Z-
dc.date.issued1998-
dc.identifier.citationSeoul Journal of Economics 11 (No. 3 1998): 321-330en
dc.identifier.issn1225-0279-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10371/1138-
dc.description.abstractPopulation dynamics and oligopoly theory are combined to formulate international fishery under imperfect competition. It is assumed that fish harvesting countries behave as oligopolist, but their costs depend on their harvest rates as well as on the total fish stock, which is governed by the biological growth law. e show that the number of nonextlnct equilibria is 0, 1, or 2, and characterize the dynamic behavior of the fish stock in terms of model parameters and initial fish stock level. Finally, We analyze how the steady state equilibrium fish stock is affected by entry of a new fishing country.-
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherSeoul Journal of Economicsen
dc.subjectoligopoly theoryen
dc.subjecttotal fish stocken
dc.subjectOkuguchis modelen
dc.titleAn Oligopoly Model of Commercial Fishingen
dc.typeSNU Journalen
Appears in Collections:
College of Social Sciences (사회과학대학)Institute of Economics Research (경제연구소)Seoul Journal of EconomicsSeoul Journal of Economics vol.11(3) (Fall 1998)
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