SHERP

The Incentive to Take Care and the Deterrence of a Nuisance Suit

Cited 0 time in webofscience Cited 0 time in scopus
Authors
Wang, GyuHo
Issue Date
2002
Publisher
Seoul Journal of Economics
Citation
Seoul Journal of Economics 15 (No. 1 2002): 55-78
Keywords
incentive to take care; Nuisance suits; Litigation; Informational Asymmetry
Abstract
This paper investigates three important issues in law and economics: the incentive to take care in the presence of nuisance suits, the incentive to bring about a nuisance suit by a plaintiff, and how to resolve a legal dispute. For this, we consider a three-stage game between a plaintiff and a defendant. We identity two types of equilibria one of which prevails, depending on the parameter values. The main results show that: generally the equilibrium level of care differs from the socially optimal care level; nuisance suits are not fully deterred; in some cases, litigation cannot be avoided because of the informational asymmetry.
ISSN
1225-0279
Language
English
URI
http://hdl.handle.net/10371/1261
Files in This Item:
Appears in Collections:
College of Social Sciences (사회과학대학)Institute of Economics Research (경제연구소)Seoul Journal of EconomicsSeoul Journal of Economics vol.15(1) (Spring 2002)
  • mendeley

Items in S-Space are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.

Browse