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Public-Good Nature of Environmental Conflicts : Individual and Collective Litigations

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Authors
Park, SungHoon; Lee, Myunghoon
Issue Date
2007
Publisher
Seoul Journal of Economics
Citation
Seoul Journal of Economics 20 (No. 3 2007): 283-296
Keywords
Collective litigation; Environmental conflicts; Individual litigation; Public goods
Abstract
In environmental conflicts where private citizens sue a
polluter, a private citizen’s participation in the fight for
environmental damages is characterized by the public good
nature. We examine how the introduction of collective litigation
and asymmetric reimbursement rule affects each citizen's choice
between free-riding and participation in the collective litigation.
Following a Stackelberg model, we assume that citizens move
first and the firm follows, while each citizen has to state his
environmental damages to the court in the process. Important
findings are as follows: First, in the individual litigation, the
hungriest citizen who most highly values environmental damages
is the only one to participate. Second, in the collective litigation,
all citizens participate, provided the total damages of the
citizens' group are sufficiently larger than the damages of the
hungriest citizen. Third, under certain conditions, introduction of
the asymmetric reimbursement rule enhances the possibility that
all citizens participate in the collective litigation.
ISSN
1225-0279
Language
English
URI
http://hdl.handle.net/10371/1383
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College of Social Sciences (사회과학대학)Institute of Economics Research (경제연구소)Seoul Journal of EconomicsSeoul Journal of Economics vol.20(3) (Fall 2006)
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