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Noisy and Subjective Performance Measure in Promotion Tournaments

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dc.contributor.authorKwon, Illoong-
dc.date.accessioned2012-05-31T09:03:16Z-
dc.date.available2012-05-31T09:03:16Z-
dc.date.issued2012-04-
dc.identifier.citationSeoul Journal of Economics, Vol.25 No.2, pp. 207-221-
dc.identifier.issn1225-0279-
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10371/76710-
dc.description.abstractThis paper considers both incentive and sorting effects of a promotion

tournament, and analyzes the optimal degree of uncertainty

in the agents' performance measure. In a subjective promotion tournament

where the winner is determined by the principal's belief about

the agents' ability, this paper shows that a noisy performance measure

can have a positive incentive effect and a negative sorting effect.

Therefore, it can be optimal for the principal to intentionally choose

a noisy performance measure.
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dc.language.isoen-
dc.publisherInstitute of Economic Research, Seoul National University-
dc.subjectNoisy performance measure-
dc.subjectSubjective tournament-
dc.subjectSorting-
dc.titleNoisy and Subjective Performance Measure in Promotion Tournaments-
dc.typeSNU Journal-
dc.contributor.AlternativeAuthor권일웅-
dc.citation.journaltitleSeoul Journal of Economics-
dc.citation.endpage221-
dc.citation.number2-
dc.citation.pages207-221-
dc.citation.startpage207-
dc.citation.volume25-
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