Publications
Detailed Information
Optimal Contracts of Public-Private Partnerships with Demand Risk
DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Kang, Daechang | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2012-09-06T02:30:18Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2012-09-06T02:30:18Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2012-07 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | Seoul Journal of Economics, Vol.25 No.3, pp. 255-278 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 1225-0279 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/10371/78917 | - |
dc.description.abstract | The paper analyzes the service provision of infrastructure from the
aspect of demand risk sharing. The society benefits more under the public-private partnership (PPP) than under government operation, because the government can transfer some risks to private firms through PPP. To reduce total cost, the government is more likely to apply PPP to projects with large risk factors. Using a two-period model, the paper examines the dynamic features of the optimal contract under the PPP. The optimal incentive scheme should be stronger during the second than the first period. As the performance target becomes lower, the incentive power increases in both periods with a higher increase in the first period. As the intertemporal externality becomes stronger, the incentive power increases in both periods with a higher increase in the second period. As the risk or risk aversion increases, the incentive power decreases in both periods, which resembles the static feature. | - |
dc.language.iso | en | - |
dc.publisher | Institute of Economic Research, Seoul National University | - |
dc.subject | Public-private partnerships | - |
dc.subject | Incentive | - |
dc.subject | Risk sharing | - |
dc.subject | Intertemporal externality | - |
dc.title | Optimal Contracts of Public-Private Partnerships with Demand Risk | - |
dc.type | SNU Journal | - |
dc.contributor.AlternativeAuthor | 강대창 | - |
dc.citation.journaltitle | Seoul Journal of Economics | - |
dc.citation.endpage | 278 | - |
dc.citation.number | 3 | - |
dc.citation.pages | 255-278 | - |
dc.citation.startpage | 255 | - |
dc.citation.volume | 25 | - |
- Appears in Collections:
- Files in This Item:
Item View & Download Count
Items in S-Space are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.