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The Equivalence of t-wise and Pareto Optimality
DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Benveniste, Lawrence | - |
dc.contributor.author | Jun, Byoung Heon | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2009-01-15 | - |
dc.date.available | 2009-01-15 | - |
dc.date.issued | 1990-07 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | Seoul Journal of Economics, Vol.3 No.3, pp. 239-254 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 1225-0279 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/10371/896 | - |
dc.description.abstract | We study the optimality of allocations obtained in an economy in which agents are not coordinated by a single consistent system like Walrasian auctioneer. In order to exploit all the opportunities for mutually beneficial trade, people must find a way to coordinate themselves beyond the limitation set by the incomplete market structure. We will consider economies whose market structure does not necessarily permit a full coordination, and completely characterize the condition which must be satisfied to guarantee a Pareto optimal outcome. Our result generalizes previous equivalence conditions. | - |
dc.language.iso | en | - |
dc.publisher | Institute of Economic Research, Seoul National University | - |
dc.subject | t-wise and Pareto | - |
dc.subject | Goldman Starr Condition | - |
dc.title | The Equivalence of t-wise and Pareto Optimality | - |
dc.type | SNU Journal | - |
dc.contributor.AlternativeAuthor | 전병헌 | - |
dc.citation.journaltitle | Seoul Journal of Economics | - |
dc.citation.endpage | 254 | - |
dc.citation.number | 3 | - |
dc.citation.pages | 239-254 | - |
dc.citation.startpage | 239 | - |
dc.citation.volume | 3 | - |
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