SHERP

An N-Person Bargaining Process with Alternating Demands

Cited 0 time in webofscience Cited 0 time in scopus
Authors
Chae, Suchan; Yang, JeongAe
Issue Date
1990
Publisher
Seoul Journal of Economics
Citation
Seoul Journal of Economics 3 (No. 3 1990): 255-262
Keywords
bagaining game
Abstract
We analyze an n-person bargaining game where players alternatingly demand their shares of a pie, and show that the set of perfect equilibria is a singleton if the common discount factor is below a certain cirtical level, and a continuum otherwise.
ISSN
1225-0279
Language
English
URI
http://hdl.handle.net/10371/897
Files in This Item:
Appears in Collections:
College of Social Sciences (사회과학대학)Institute of Economics Research (경제연구소)Seoul Journal of EconomicsSeoul Journal of Economics vol.03(3) (Fall 1990)
  • mendeley

Items in S-Space are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.

Browse