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An N-Person Bargaining Process with Alternating Demands

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Authors

Chae, Suchan; Yang, JeongAe

Issue Date
1990-07
Publisher
Institute of Economic Research, Seoul National University
Citation
Seoul Journal of Economics, Vol.3 No.3, pp. 255-262
Keywords
bagaining game
Abstract
We analyze an n-person bargaining game where players alternatingly demand their shares of a pie, and show that the set of perfect equilibria is a singleton if the common discount factor is below a certain cirtical level, and a continuum otherwise.
ISSN
1225-0279
Language
English
URI
https://hdl.handle.net/10371/897
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College of Social Sciences (사회과학대학)Institute of Economics Research (경제연구소)Seoul Journal of Economics (SJE)Seoul Journal of Economics vol.03(3) (Fall 1990)
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