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Long-term Contracts and the Optimal Choice of Monetary Instruments

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dc.contributor.authorAhn, C. W.-
dc.contributor.authorJung, W. S.-
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-15T04:44:44Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-15T04:44:44Z-
dc.date.issued1991-
dc.identifier.citationSeoul Journal of Economics 4 (No. 2 1991): 123-140en
dc.identifier.issn1225-0279-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10371/911-
dc.description.abstractThis paper studies the implications of long-term contracts for the optimal choice of a monetary instrument. it shows that an increase in the (average) contract length of the economy enables the monetary authority to reduce output variance under either instrument, the interest rate or the money stock. However, an interest rate policy seems to reduce the variance proportionately more than a money stock policy. Nevertheless, the choice of the optimal instrument is invariant with respect to the contract length.-
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherSeoul Journal of Economicsen
dc.subjectIS-LMen
dc.subjectmoney stock policyen
dc.subjectinstrument choiceen
dc.titleLong-term Contracts and the Optimal Choice of Monetary Instrumentsen
dc.typeSNU Journalen
Appears in Collections:
College of Social Sciences (사회과학대학)Institute of Economics Research (경제연구소)Seoul Journal of EconomicsSeoul Journal of Economics vol.04(2) (Summer 1991)
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