Study on Reversing Nuclear Decision

Abstract

This paper is searching for reasons why a country reverses its nuclear decision by looking at the South Koreas case in the 1970s. During the period, it was the time when security threats were surrounding South Korea. When the president revoked the plan in 1976, provocation from North Korea was continuously increasing yet. What made this concession possible? To find the answer, first I review the interpretation of realism on nuclear proliferation and point out that evaluation of countrys intention is undermined. To better understand the intention of countrys nuclear decision, I review Hymans and Solingens work, which focuses on individual leaders perception and domestic politics influence to the leader, respectively.

Arguing that leaders perception is influenced by international security dynamics, and to explain why South Korean President Park ended up with reversing his nuclear decision, I use the concept of coercive diplomacy described by Alexander George. Testing the event between 1974 and 1976, I argue that the U.S. coercive diplomacy was successful because it could offer reciprocal inducement (the U.S. security commitment), which South Korean government was seeking for. Nonetheless, I conclude that the influence of nuclear project of South Korea on the U.S. foreign policy is limited during the specific period, because it was not only the South Korean nuclear program but also the Ford administration which reevaluated the strategic importance of East Asia.