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On the Coincidence of the Shapley Value and the Nucleolus in Queueing Problems

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Issue Date
2007-04
Publisher
Institute of Economic Research, Seoul National University
Citation
Seoul Journal of Economics, Vol.20 No.2, pp. 223-238
Keywords
Queueing problemsMinimal transfer ruleNucleolusCoincidence
Abstract
Given a group of agents to be served in a facility, the

queueing problem is concerned with finding the order to serve

agents and the (positive or negative) monetary compensations

they should receive. As shown in Maniquet (2003), the minimal

transfer rule coincides with the Shapley value of the game

obtained by defining the worth of each coalition to be the

minimum total waiting cost incurred by its members under the

assumption that they are served before the non-coalitional

members. Here, we show that it coincides with the nucleolus of

the same game. Thereby, we establish the coincidence of the

Shapley value and the nucleolus for queueing problems. We also

investigate the relations between the minimal transfer rule and

other rules discussed in the literature.
ISSN
1225-0279
Language
English
URI
https://hdl.handle.net/10371/1380
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College of Social Sciences (사회과학대학)Institute of Economics Research (경제연구소)Seoul Journal of Economics (SJE)Seoul Journal of Economics vol.20(2) (Summer 2007)
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