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On the Coincidence of the Shapley Value and the Nucleolus in Queueing Problems
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- Authors
- Issue Date
- 2007-04
- Citation
- Seoul Journal of Economics, Vol.20 No.2, pp. 223-238
- Keywords
- Queueing problems ; Minimal transfer rule ; Nucleolus ; Coincidence
- Abstract
- Given a group of agents to be served in a facility, the
queueing problem is concerned with finding the order to serve
agents and the (positive or negative) monetary compensations
they should receive. As shown in Maniquet (2003), the minimal
transfer rule coincides with the Shapley value of the game
obtained by defining the worth of each coalition to be the
minimum total waiting cost incurred by its members under the
assumption that they are served before the non-coalitional
members. Here, we show that it coincides with the nucleolus of
the same game. Thereby, we establish the coincidence of the
Shapley value and the nucleolus for queueing problems. We also
investigate the relations between the minimal transfer rule and
other rules discussed in the literature.
- ISSN
- 1225-0279
- Language
- English
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