Two-Level Games between the Two Koreas -Political and Military Inter-Korean Talks, 2008~2017 -
남북회담과 양면게임 이론 -2008~2017년 정치∙군사회담을 중심으로-

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행정대학원 글로벌행정전공
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서울대학교 대학원
학위논문 (석사)-- 서울대학교 대학원 : 행정대학원 글로벌행정전공, 2018. 8. 구민교.
This study analyzes political and military Inter-Korean talks between the year of 2008 and 2017. Based on Putnam’s Two Level game theory, the winsets of each talks were thoroughly examined. According to Putnam, there are three factors that determines winset size
the distribution of power, preferences, and possible coalitions among Level 2 constituents, Level 2 political institutions, and Level 1 negotiator’s strategies.

Level 1 refers to negotiation itself and Level 2 is domestic society. In this study, three determinants were modified in the context of reality of Korean peninsula. Level 1 negotiator’s strategies refer to Level 1 negotiator’s autonomy, which includes the chief negotiator’s rank, position, and experience. Level 2 preferences and coalitions were analyzed by specific agendas in each talks. In addition, Level 2 political institutions were set as fixed variable.

In order to do the comprehensive analysis, the graph was introduced putting x-axis as Level 1 autonomy and y-axis as Level 2 preference and coalition. Inter-Korean talks for ten years were located on the graph. This graph shows that Level 1 is more influential than Level 2 in Inter-Korean talks. We also can find that the powerful chief negotiator can enlarge Level 2 winset, so he/she can achieve to make consensus even though when Level 2 winset is very small.
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Graduate School of Public Administration (행정대학원)Dept. of Public Administration (행정학과)Theses (Master's Degree_행정학과)
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