PrOS: Light-Weight Privatized Se cure OSes in ARM TrustZone

Abstract

TrustZone is a hardware security technique in ARM mobile devices. Using TrustZone, software components running within the secure world can be completely isolated from the normal world, which ensures hardware-enforced security access control over the underlying computing resources. In order to support multiple trusted applications, TrustZone runs its own operating system, called the secure OS, within the secure world. Unfortunately, attackers have been exploiting privilege escalation vulnerabilities in a secure OS, as reported in most of major secure OSes from product vendors including Samsung, Huawei, and Qualcomm. More critically, as all trusted applications are running on the same secure OS instance, compromising the secure OS leads to compromising all trusted applications, rendering the secure OS as a single point of failure endangering the entire TrustZone & x0027;s security. This paper presents PrOS, our mechanism to privatize secure OSes through direct virtualization of TrustZone. PrOS allows each trusted application to run with its own secure OS such that the secure OS is no longer a single point of security failure. One particular challenge for PrOS lies in how efficiently to implement software-only virtualization for TrustZone for a practical deployment in real systems despite the condition that the current ARM architectures do not support hardware-assisted virtualization for TrustZone. As opposed to the common belief that software-only virtualization is inefficient and sluggish, we have found several common design features inherent in the secure OS to leverage for optimally tailoring the TrustZone virtualization scheme. We implemented PrOS on a 64-bit ARM development board. According to our evaluation, PrOS incurs 0.02 and 1.18 percent performance overheads on average in the normal and secure worlds, respectively, demonstrating its effectiveness in the field.