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Duopoly Competition Considering Waiting Cost

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Authors
Nam, Ick-Hyun
Issue Date
1997
Publisher
서울대학교 경영정보연구소
Citation
Journal of information and operations management, Vol.07, pp. 105-115
Abstract
In this paper we consider two queueing systems that serve a large number of customers. Those two queueing systems compete for customers. Prices, (p1, p2), for each queueing system are announced, and each individual user makes a decision whether to join the queueing systems. In case a user decides to enter, he should determine which of the two queueing systems to join. Mendelson(1985) analyzes internal pricing scheme to control the job flow into a queueing system. Mendelson model considers the special case where all jobs are homogeneous in their time values and expected service requirements. But jobs usually have heterogeneous values specifying the gross value gained by system users per unit time. An important extension of Mendelson model was made by Mendelson and Whang. Mendelson and Whang(1990) consider an M/M/1 queueing system with multiple user classes. Each class is characterized by its delay cost per unit of time, its expected service time and its demand function. They derive a pricing mechanism which is optimal and incentive-compatible in the sense that the arrival rates and execution priorities jointly maximize the expected net value of the system while being determined, on a decentralized basis, by individual users.
Language
English
URI
https://hdl.handle.net/10371/53149
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College of Business Administration/Business School (경영대학/대학원)Institute of Information and Operation Management (경영정보연구소)Journal of information and operations management (경영정보논총)Journal of information and operations management vol.07 (1997) (경영정보논총)
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