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Group bargaining with representation

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Authors
Chae, Suchan
Issue Date
2009-04
Publisher
Institute of Economic Research, Seoul National University
Citation
Seoul Journal of Economics, Vol.22 No.2, pp. 245-262
Keywords
Group bargainingNash bargaining solutionRepresentationDelegation
Abstract
We study a strategic bargaining model where two groups of

individuals first choose their representatives, who then bargain

with each other using a standard alternating-offer protocol, and

then the shares of the members of a group are determined by a

similar n-person bargaining process within the group. We show

that there exists a unique perfect equilibrium outcome of this

three-stage game when the breakdown probabilities of both the

inter-group bargaining and intra-group bargaining are small. In

equilibrium, each group selects as its representative an individual

who has the greatest marginal gain from increasing the groups

share.
ISSN
1225-0279
Language
English
URI
https://hdl.handle.net/10371/67704
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College of Social Sciences (사회과학대학)Institute of Economics Research (경제연구소)Seoul Journal of EconomicsSeoul Journal of Economics vol.22 no.1~4 (2009)
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