Publications
Detailed Information
Nash Implementation under Allocative Constraints
Cited 0 time in
Web of Science
Cited 0 time in Scopus
- Authors
- Issue Date
- 2012-12
- Publisher
- 서울대학교 경제연구소
- Citation
- 경제논집, Vol.51 No.2, pp. 367-378
- Keywords
- Nash implementation ; Social choice rules ; Exchange economies ; Monotonicity
- Abstract
- In exchange economies, we investigate social choice rules that can be implemented in
Nash equilibrium under some allocative constraints. Allocative constraints can represent standard normative requirements such as efficiency and fairness and are formulated by a fixed set of allocations from which outcome functions (of game forms) can take values. We show that an extended notion of Maskins monotonicity[Maskin(1977, 1999)] is a necessary and sufficient condition for Nash implementation under allocative constraints.
- ISSN
- 1738-1150
- Language
- English
- Files in This Item:
- Appears in Collections:
Item View & Download Count
Items in S-Space are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.