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Interdependent Value Auctions with an Insider Bidder
| DC Field | Value | Language |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.author | Kim, Jinwoo | - |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2016-05-30T04:16:43Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2016-05-30T04:16:43Z | - |
| dc.date.issued | 2016-04 | - |
| dc.identifier.citation | Seoul Journal of Economics, Vol.29 No.2, pp. 151-163 | - |
| dc.identifier.issn | 1225-0279 | - |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/10371/96653 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | We study the efficiency of standard auctions with interdependent
values in which one of two bidders is perfectly informed of his value while the other is partially informed. The second-price auction, as well as English auction, has a unique ex-post equilibrium that yields efficient allocation. By contrast, the first-price auction has no efficient equilibrium. | - |
| dc.language.iso | en | - |
| dc.publisher | Institute of Economic Research, Seoul National University | - |
| dc.subject | Interdependent value | - |
| dc.subject | Insider | - |
| dc.subject | Second-price auction | - |
| dc.subject | First-price auction | - |
| dc.title | Interdependent Value Auctions with an Insider Bidder | - |
| dc.type | SNU Journal | - |
| dc.contributor.AlternativeAuthor | 김진우 | - |
| dc.citation.journaltitle | Seoul Journal of Economics | - |
| dc.citation.endpage | 163 | - |
| dc.citation.number | 2 | - |
| dc.citation.pages | 151-163 | - |
| dc.citation.startpage | 151 | - |
| dc.citation.volume | 29 | - |
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