Well-being, Virtue and Education

Abstract

It is briefly argued that happiness is essential to well -betng and that well-being is incompatible with ignorance of important aspects of our circumstances. Note is taken of the close link between virtue and

happiness in ancient writers and the ontrast between this and the modern view that Moral education and virtuous action are undertaken

for the sake of society rather than the pupil or agent. Against this, it is

argued that a life of well-being is incompatible with systematic Wickedness, irrespective of whether the agent has reason to fear discovery and punishment. Contrary to the informed desire theory of well-being it is held that the range of opinions which can form the basis of a flourishing life is restricted and that a life of wickedness does not fall within it because of its necessary destruction of the bonds of human

solidarity between the agent and others. Reasons are given for endorsing Plato's claim that no-one knowingly does wrong and that a life of wickedness cannot be the object of rational choice. Consequently,

it is suggested, Moral Education is most expediently constdered a matter of enabling pupils to become aware of this fact rather than of simply inculcating rules of social conformity.