Different Ways of Interpreting the Kornilov Affair : A Review of George Katkov's The Kornilov Affair: Kerensky and the Break-up of the Russian Army, London and New York: Longman, 1980.

Abstract

Just after the July Crisis resulting from the Bolsheviks' attempt to seize power, the Provisional Government had to deal with another very strange and fatal event in Russian history. The delicate conflict between the Provisional Government without a real power base and the military power reached its highest tension in late August, which led to the dismissal of General Kornilov, the Supreme Commander of the Russian Armed Force by Kerensky, the Prime Minister, who had appointed the former to that post less than two months before. Although historians of 1917 seem to agree that this event was decisive in hastening the downfall of the Provisional Government and assuring the success of the Bolsheviks, they have advanced a multitude of different interpretations in characterizing it. In general, the Kornilov affair has been interpreted in three different ways. The first one is, as Kerensky claimed, at the time and afterward, that Kornilov plotted to overthrow the Provisional Government and to assume dictatorial powers. The second interpretation holds that the whole affair resulted from an unfortunate misunderstanding between the prime minister and his commander in chief. The third view is that Kerensky trapped Kornilov by first ordering the General to send a cavalry corps to Petrograd to help suppress an anticipated Bolshevik uprising, and then, when Kornilov did as instructed, accusing him of sending the troops to topple the government. This was Kornilov's own view of the matter.